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THE NSA DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM:
AN ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
DURING AN ERA OF ONE-PARTY RULE
Tara M. Sugiyama*
Marisa Perry**
On December 16, 2005, the New York Times sounded a fire alarm when it re-
vealed that, in response to the September I1, 2001 attacks, President George W
Bush had issued a secret executive order permitting the National Security Agency
(NSA) to conduct warrantless surveillance on individuals to unearth nascent ter-
rorist activity. Congress responded to the disclosure of the NSA domestic
surveillance program largely by shirking its oversight duties. This Note argues that
when a single party controls both the executive and the legislative branches, the
fire-alarm model fails to provide sufficient congressional oversight. Short of future
elections altering the balance of power this Note argues that Congress should seek
new methods that readily engage bipartisan support and judicial review to oversee
secret executive programs more effectively.
INTRODUCTION
On December 16, 2005, the New York Times sounded a fire
alarm' when it revealed that, in response to the September 11,
2001 attacks, President George W. Bush had issued a secret
executive order permitting the National Security Agency (NSA) to
conduct warrantless surveillance on individuals within the United
States to unearth nascent terrorist activity.
2 The executive order 3
purportedly authorized the NSA to monitor the telephone and
email messages of tens of millions of unsuspecting individuals in its
effort to track down links to Al Qaeda.' Almost immediately,
* University of Michigan Law School, J.D. expected 2007; Yale University, B.A. 2002.
Managing Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. Many thanks to Marisa Perry. I
am also grateful to Professor Marvin Krislov for his guidance and to my family for their en-
couragement.
** University of Michigan Law School, J.D. 2006; Duke University, B.S. 1996. Associ-
ate,Jenner & Block, LLP, Chicago, IL.
I. See infra text accompanying notes 15-19.
2. James Risen & Eric Lichtblati, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
3. The executive order signed by President Bush in 2002 remains classified. See id.
4. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 2, at Al. In December 2005, the New York Times re-
ported that the NSA surveillance program monitored perhaps thousands of communications
of individuals within the United States. Id. On May 11, 2006, USA Today revealed that the NSA
had actually collected communications of tens of millions of Americans, including records of
purely domestic phone calls. Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans' Phone
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various interest groups began to question the constitutionality of
the NSA domestic surveillance program and to challenge whether
the scope of the program violates the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).
Congress responded to the disclosure of the NSA domestic sur-
veillance program largely by shirking its oversight duties.
Undaunted by a unified executive branch that shunned oversight,
6
Democratic members of Congress repeatedly pressed for a com-
prehensive investigation into the surveillance program. Lacking
support from a majority of the Republican members of Congress,
however, Democratic efforts at oversight made little headway in
breaching the unitary executive wall.8
Part I of this Note introduces theoretical models that Congress
may employ to conduct oversight of executive branch activities
such as the NSA domestic surveillance program. Part II situates the
NSA program within the context of FISA and the USA PATRIOT
Act, discussing the controversy surrounding the legality of the pro-
gram. Part III examines the strategy employed by the majority
party, the minority party, and interest groups in seeking to conduct
oversight of the NSA program, and the response of the executive
branch to such efforts. Part IV concludes by analyzing lessons from
the fire-alarm model and proposes alternative methods of congres-
sional oversight. As illustrated in the case of the NSA domestic
surveillance program, when a single party controls both the execu-
tive and the legislative branches, the fire-alarm model fails to
provide sufficient congressional oversight, and short of future elec-
tions altering the balance of power, Congress should seek new
methods that more readily engage bipartisan support and judicial
review to oversee secret executive programs more effectively.
I. THEORETICAL MODELS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
The Constitution does not explicitly vest Congress with plenary
power to conduct investigative oversight of the executive branch.9
The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted the Constitution as
providing Congress with inherent power to oversee executive
Calls, USATODAY.COM, May 11, 2006, www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-
nsax.htm.
5. See infra Part III.D.
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. See infra Part III.C.
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. MORTON ROSENBERG, INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY 3 (Novinka Books 2003).
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branch activities that may violate the will of Congress.0° Accord-
ingly, two primary models have emerged to guide members of
Congress through the execution of their oversight duties: the po-
lice-patrol and the fire-alarm models of congressional oversight."
Under the "police-patrol" model of congressional oversight,
Congress takes a proactive role in examining actions of the execu-
tive branch to unearth evidence of maladministration. 2 Members
of Congress may conduct this direct form of oversight by request-
ing documents from the executive branch, holding hearings, and
commissioning reports. 3 The goal of this form of oversight is for
members of Congress to identify, dissuade, and remedy any execu-
tive branch violations of legislative goals.
4
Alternatively, members of Congress may follow the "fire-alarm"
model of congressional oversight.'- Under this more cost-effective
10. E.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504, n.15 (1975)
("[T]he scope of the power of inquiry.., is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential
power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.") (internal quotations omitted);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187
(1957) ("The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative
process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes,"); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
U.S. 135, 177 (1927).
11. See generally Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. POL. SCl. 165 (1984) (describing the
police-patrol and the fire-alarm models of congressional oversight); Arthur Lupia & Mathew
D. McCubbins, Learning From Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J.L.
EcON. & ORG. 96 (1994) (revisiting the police-patrol and fire-alarm models of congressional
oversight).
12. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 166.
13. Id. Some examples of police-patrol oversight and alternatives to fire-alarm over-
sight include the following actions by Congress: conducting field observations, utilizing
agencies like the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Department of Defense (DOD),
or Department of Justice (DOJ); establishing task forces like those used for the Iran hostage
or Cheney energy issues; creating a commission like that used for the attacks of September
11, 2001; seeking censure; seeking impeachment; asking for independent counsels; using
legislative holds; and using the power of the purse to limit funding for undesirable pro-
grams. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 166; see Creating a Task Force of Members
of the Foreign Affairs Committee to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding
of Americans as Hostages in Iran in 1980, H.R. Res. 255, 102d Cong. (1991); GEN. ACcT.
OFF., ENERGY TASK FORCE: PROCESS USED TO DEVELOP THE NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 4
(2003), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/gaoreports/index.html (click "advanced
search" hyperlink; then type "Energy Task Force Process Used to Develop the National En-
ergy Policy" in the "Report Tide" field; then follow PDF link); Elisabeth Bumiller, Congress
Rebuffed on Energy Documents, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at A16; David E. Rosenbaum, The
Iran-Contra Report: News Analysis; The Inquiry That Couldn't, N.Y. TIM ss,Jan. 19, 1994, at Al.
14. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 166.
15. Id. The fire-alarm approach to congressional oversight dates back to 1792 when an
Indian attack that killed hundreds of U.S. troops prompted the House to investigate. David
Nather, Congress as Watchdog: Asleep on the Job, 62 CQ WEEKLY 1190, 1190 (2004). During the
Civil War, Congress investigated the defeat of the Union at Bull Run and Ball's Bluff. Id. In
the twentieth century, Congress continued to respond to fire alarms, establishing numerous
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model, in which members of Congress avoid spending time inves-
tigating actions of the executive branch that do not cause harm,
Congress establishes procedures to respond to complaints of inter-
est groups and then waits for fire alarms to sound.'6 Once an
interest group brings an issue-such as the legality of the NSA do-
mestic surveillance program-to the fore, Congress decides
whether to investigate the fire alarm. Over time, members of
Congress theoretically learn to decipher which fire alarms deserve
further attention. '8After investigating the executive branch, Con-
gress may then charge it with violating the will of Congress and
seek remedies from agencies, courts, and Congress. 9
In the case of the NSA domestic surveillance program, both
models of congressional oversight have failed. This Note will exam-
ine how Congress initially abdicated the police-patrol model of
oversight and later declined to respond effectively with fire-alarm
oversight once the New York Times sounded the alarm.
II. BACKDROP TO THE NSA DOMESTIC
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
The federal government began expanding its powers of surveil-
lance long before the events of September 11, 2001.20 The
expansion of surveillance occurred in both the foreign and domes-
tic realms. Although executive authority to conduct foreign
surveillance has remained largely unchallenged, surveillance of
individuals in the United States by the Bush administration cur-
investigations: Financial Trusts Investigation (1912-1913); Teapot Dome Investigation 1923-
1924); Defense Programs Investigation (1941-1948); Kefauver Crime Hearings (1950-
1951); McCarthy Investigations (1953-1954); Watergate Investigation (1973-1974); Church
Committee on CIA (1975-1976); Iran-Contra Investigation (1986-1987); Clinton Investiga-
tions (1995-1999). Id. at 1190-95.
16. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 166. Interest groups may include, but are
not limited to, constituents, private citizens, public interest groups, the media, and members
of academia. See infra Part III.D.
17. Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 11, at 97-98.
18. Id.
19. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 166.
20. For example, in 1968 Congress adopted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act. Title III of the Act, commonly known as the "Federal Wiretap Act," sets forth
court procedures for authorization of real-time surveillance of electronic communications.
18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. Fifteen years later, President Ronald Reagan signed an executive
order permitting warrantless physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes. Exec. Or-
der No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981). In 1994, President Bill Clinton lobbied to
extend warrantless "clandestine searches at foreign embassies in Washington and other cities
without a federal court order." R. Jeffrey Smith, Administration Backing No-Warrant Spy
Searches, WASH. POST,July 15, 1994, at A19.
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rently faces considerable challenge." Some commentators have
begun to question both the legality of the administration's actions
and the degree to which those actions are constitutional with little
guidance from the courts. Despite congressional efforts to limit
executive power in this area during the 1970s, the attacks of Sep-
tember 11 th and the resulting "war on terror" significantly affected
how Congress and the American public have interpreted the scope
of executive authority and the degree to which they have been will-
ing to sacrifice personal liberties at the altar of national security.
A. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (FISA)23 principally in response to covert intelligence gather-
ing activities conducted during the Nixon administration. As the
1970s unfolded, the continuing controversy over the war in Viet-
nam and Watergate led to renewed oversight by Congress, and
ultimately to President Richard Nixon's resignation. For example,
disclosures that the U.S. Army had been spying on U.S. citizens,
together with later reports of covert and illegal CIA activities,
prompted a congressional investigation led by Senator Frank
Church. 4 The Church Committee published a series of reports in
1975 and 1976, detailing the operations of U.S. intelligence agen-
cies. One of those reports, published in 1976, revealed that the
NSA had been spying on U.S. citizens.
FISA was designed to limit executive power by proscribing
practices by which the administration could conduct surveillance.
Specifically, the administration can conduct electronic surveillance
within the context of foreign intelligence gathering only if the
surveillance meets certain conditions.2 " The Act permits warrantless
21. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 2, at Al.
22. Adam Liptak, Domestic Surveillance: The Legal Precedents; Little Help Fromjustices on Spy
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at A21.
23. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat.
1783 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 50 U.S.C.).
24. S. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., INTELLI-
GENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK II, FINAL REPORT § I.C (April 26,
1976), available at http://www.icdc.com/-paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreporlla.htm;
seeJohn Diamond, NSA's Surveillance of Citizens Echoes 1970s Controversy, USATODAY.COM, Dec.
18, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-12-18-nsa-70sx.htm.
25. S. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., supra note
24, § I.C.
26. CONG. RES. SERV., THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS 2-4 (2004), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL30465. pdf.
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surveillance for a period up to one year if it is for the purpose of
foreign intelligence gathering and has a minimal likelihood of
acquiring information about U.S. citizens. 7 Under FISA, the
President authorizes warrantless surveillance through the Attorney
General, and the Attorney General certifies the qualifying
conditions to the FISA court.28 In an emergency, the Act permits
federal agencies to conduct surveillance for up to seventy-two
hours before they must notify the FISA court and seek a search
warrant.29 In times of war, FISA authorizes the President to engage
in warrantless wiretaps for up to fifteen days, though the extension
of his authority in that instance depends on congressional
approval.0
Alternatively, the administration can seek authorization for wire-
taps from a secret, non-adversarial court known as the FISA court.
3'
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court now selects eleven (for-
merly seven) FISA court judges for terms of seven years.3 The FISA
court conducts all proceedings ex parte where the Department of
Justice (DOJ) presents the only evidence heard in the case.33 With
both warranless and court-approved surveillance, the administra-
tion bears the burden of proving that the surveillance will have
little or no likelihood of gathering information about U.S. citi-
zens. 34 Surveillance conducted in violation of FISA carries
significant civil and criminal liabilities. 5
Congress designed FISA to curtail executive authority for surveil-
lance rather than for law enforcement purposes. 6 FISA limited
warrantless surveillance to "foreign powers" and surveillance under
court order to situations where probable cause justified surveil-
lance of a "foreign power" or an "agent of a foreign power."3 7 As a
27. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 (e), 1802(a) (2000).
28. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802(a) (2), (3) (2000).
29. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(0 (2) (2000).
30. Danie! Halberstam, Director, University of Michigan European Law Program, Ad-
dress at the Ethics in Public Life Forum: What Limits Should There Be on American
Intelligence-Gathering (Domestic and Foreign) During an Age of International Terrorism?
(Mar. 13, 2006).
31. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2000).
32. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (Supp. III 2003) (requiring the designation of eleven
judges), with 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2000) (requiring the designation of seven judges).
33. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(0 (2000).
34. 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (2000).
35. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1809-1810 (2000).
36. 151 CONG. REc. S14275-01, 14279 (Dec. 21, 2005) ("In 1978, when Congress
passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to permit the Government to seek court
orders to tap the phones of people in the United States, Congress put in the law a check-
the FISA Court-on the executive branch's authority.").
37. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 (a), (b) (2000) define the terms "foreign powers" and "agent of a
foreign power."
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result, Congress approved surveillance Linder FISA only where its
purpose was intelligence gathering. That limitation fell with the
Twin Towers on September 11,2001.
B. The Aftermath of September 11, 2001: The USA PATRIOT
Act and Warrantless Surveillance
In response to the terrorist attacks, President Bush signed Public
Law 107-56, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act (USA PATRIOT Act) on October 26, 2001.38 The Act includes
several significant amendments to FISA.3 " First, the amendments
approve searches where criminal prosecution of individuals is the
primary purpose of the search, so long as a significant intelligence
purpose remains.4 These amendments represent a fundamental
shift in focus from FISA as a tool for surveillance to FISA as a tool
for law enforcement. The government, therefore, need no longer
cloak its prosecutorial interests in the guise of foreign intelligence;
the bar for initiating surveillance is much lower. Second, the Act
increases the number of judges on the FISA court from seven to
eleven.41 Third, the Act expands FISA's coverage with respect to
certain data gathering devices and business records. Finally, the
Act also amends FISA to include a private right of action for private
citizens who are illegally monitored.43
Within months of the attacks, the President also issued an
executive order authorizing the NSA to conduct warrantless
surveillance of American citizens and others within the United
States. 4 Although details of the program are sparse, the initial
report was staggering-500 U.S. citizens and between 5,000 and
7,000 non-citizens were being monitored by the NSA at any given
time with no judicial approval.4 The obvious question for many is
whether or not President Bush has the authority to authorize
38. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1 (2001)).
39. Jean-Paul Brodeur & St~phane Leman-Langlois, Surveillance Fiction or Higher Polic-
ing?, in THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEILLANCE AND VISIBILITY 171, 186-87 (Kevin D.
Haggerty & Richard V. Erickson eds., 2006).
40. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a) (7) (B) (Supp. I1 2003).
41. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (Supp. III 2003).
42. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1862 (Supp. I1 2003).
43. CONG. RFS. SERV., supra note 26, at 56.
44. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 2, at Al.
45. Id. See also sources cited supra note 4.
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domestic surveillance without a warrant, and if he does, what
limits, if any, exist on that power.
The PATRIOT Act was not the first signal to the American pub-
lic that the government was watching, but it was a significant one.
The Act, in essence, facilitated government surveillance of citizens
by reducing the procedural hurdles facing an eager executive.
Given the fevered political climate after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, the country was willing to sacrifice some civil liber-
ties in the name of national security.
C. The Controversy with Warrantless Surveillance
Both FISA and the USA PATRIOT Act must be viewed against a
backdrop of judicial silence with respect to executive power to
spy on U.S. citizens. The Supreme Court has never squarely ad-
dressed the question of whether, under the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure, electronic surveil-
lance of people within the United States is constitutional for the
purposes espoused by President Bush 6 Between the 1920s and
1967, conversations were not considered protected under the
Fourth Amendment, and thus, wiretapping was not considered a
search and seizure.47 In 1967, however, the Court in Berger v. New
York48 changed course and extended Fourth Amendment protec-
tions to conversations when it overruled a New York electronic
surveillance statute it deemed a "blanket grant of permission to
eavesdrop ... without adequate supervision or protective proce-
dures."49 The Court in Berger declined to rule on whether the
Constitution permits a "national security" exemption, noting that
the decision to allow such an exemption should be made by "legis-
lative bodies" because there is no express prohibition in the Fourth
Amendment.50 The Court enhanced protections for U.S. residents
in 1972 when it held that electronic surveillance in domestic secu-
rity matters requires proper warrant procedure. Importantly, no
judgment was made on "the scope of the President's surveillance
power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or
without this country.,5 2 Since then, lower courts have split on
46. Liptak, supra note 22, at A21.
47. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
48. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
49. Id. at 60.
50. Id.
51. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the East. Dist. of Mich. (Keith), 407 U.S.
297, 320 (1972).
52. Id. at 308.
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whether the administration can conduct surveillance on commu-
nication between citizens and their international contacts. 3
President Bush faces strong legal challenges to his warrantless
surveillance program. On its face, the program directly conflicts
with the FISA proscription on warrantless wiretapping. FISA limits
warrantless surveillance to gathering foreign intelligence or target-
ing foreign powers or their agents. 5 Yet here, the administration
failed to notify the FISA court of the surveillance program 56 and
surveillance has persisted long past any deadlines imposed by the
Act.57 Ultimately, either FISA requires that the Attorney General
certify the conditions for warrantless surveillance, or the Act limits
surveillance without a warrant to seventy-two hours. 5s Whether or
not surveillance of domestic citizens is authorized is an open ques-
tion.
The administration has fired back at these criticisms in several
directions. First, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales argued that
Congress authorized the surveillance program in September 2001
when it directed the President to do the following:
[T]o use all necessary and appropriate force against those na-
tions, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that oc-
curred on Sept. 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organiza-
59tions or persons.
Scholars disagree whether the authorization to use military force
has any impact on the President's authority to conduct electronic
surveillance of U.S. citizens. 0 The administration has argued that
the President has inherent authority to conduct surveillance under
53. Liptak, supra note 22, at A21.
54. Legal scholars and citizens alike have challenged the program on the grounds
that: (1) FISA does not authorize warrantless domestic surveillance without court approval;
(2) congressional authorization to use military force does not grant authority to run such a
program; and (3) the President does not have constitutionally-granted authority to conduct
surveillance of this nature. Id.
55. 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (1978).
56. Richard W. Stevenson & Adam Liptak, Cheney Defends Eavesdropping Without War-
rants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2005, at Al.
57. Douglas Jehl, Domestic Surveillance: Congressional Leaders; Among Those Thid of Pro-
gram, Few Objected, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at A21.
58. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802(a) (2), (3) (2000); 50 U.S.C. § 1805(0 (2) (2000).
59. Liptak, supra note 22, at A21.
60. See infra Part III.D.
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the auspices of national security."' Under this theory of constitu-
tional power, the President has the prerogative to order domestic
surveillance if doing so is necessary to protect the nation. To the
extent that FISA limits those powers, it would therefore be uncon-
stitutional. In addition to the inherent authority argument, the
administration has criticized FISA as outdated and inappropriate
for the demands of a war on terror. This approach plays on a be-
lief that the government must be equipped immediately to
respond to emergencies given the unique nature of terrorist
threats.
Regardless, the question remains whether Article II grants the
inherent power to conduct the surveillance that President Bush
claims. If the answer is yes, then FISA may unconstitutionally en-
croach on those powers; but it will be for the courts to decide. If,
however, the President does not have such inherent power to order
surveillance, the next question is whether members of Congress
authorized the program either by explicitly granting the use of
military force, or by implicitly remaining silent when they were in-
formed of the program. Absent congressional approval or
constitutional authorization, little legal ground remains supporting
warrantless surveillance. With so many open questions and a judi-
ciary reticent to involve itself in political affairs, -congressional
oversight may be the only route for the American public to gain
answers.
III. STRATEGY OF KEY PLAYERS
In response to the disclosure by the media of the NSA domestic
surveillance program, the Bush administration built an impenetra-
ble wall around the executive branch. Although congressional
Democrats and various interest groups attempted to pierce this
wall, the majority of Republicans bolstered the executive branch
and stymied these oversight efforts.
61. Attorney General Gonzalez stated in a press briefing in December 2005 that "[W]e
also believe the President has the inherent authority under the Constitution, as Com-
mander-in-Chief, to engage in this kind of activity." Press Briefing, Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales and General Michael Hayden (Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1 .html.
62. See David Johnston & Neil A. Lewvis, Domestic Surveillance: The White House; Defending
Spy Program, Administration Cites Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at A20.
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A. The Executive Branch Approach
When news of the NSA domestic surveillance program broke in
the December 16, 2005 New York Times article,"3 the Bush admini-
stration rallied the executive branch to present a unified front in
support of the program/ The unitary executive theory of the
presidency dates back to 1787 when the Constitution vested execu-
tive authority in a single president rather than in a committee.' '
Under this theory, constitutional text and original design grant the
President expansive powers to execute U.S. laws.6 Since the Consti-
tutional Convention, presidential assertions of the unitary
executive have waxed and waned, but in no situation has a presi-
dent significantly acquiesced to congressional interference with his
ability to execute U.S. laws.67
President Bush endorsed the unitary executive view of the presi-
dency long before the revelation of the NSA domestic surveillance
program.8 In response to the September l1th attacks, President
Bush relied on the unitary executive theory to challenge congres-
sional attempts to limit the scope of his authority.69 Vice President
Dick Cheney also voiced support for a strong unitary executive,
lamenting that "[o]ver the years there had been an erosion of
presidential power and authority."70 In Cheney's view, "[t]he presi-
dent of the United States needs to have his constitutional powers
unimpaired, if you will, in terms of the conduct of national security
policy."
7'
As part of its strategy of presenting a unified front among the
executive branch agencies and departments, the administration
used the tactic of framing the debate around the NSA program in
terms of national security.72 To win public support, President Bush's
Chief Political Adviser Karl Rove used simple language and preyed
on fear to garner support for the program: "Let me be as clear as I
63. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 2, at Al.
64. E.g.,Johnston & Lewis, supra note 62, at A20.
65. Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90
IOWA L. REv. 601, 604 (2004).
66. Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-
Centuiy, 47 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 1451, 1452-54 (1997).
67. Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Second
Half-Century, 26 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'y 667, 668-69 (2003).
68. See generally Yoo et al., supra note 65, at 722-31 (describing President George W.
Bush's support of the unitary executive theory).
69. Id. at 723-24.
70. Scott Shane, For Some, Spying Controversy Recalls a Past Drama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
2006, at Al8.
71. Id.
72. Adam Nagourney, Seeking Edge in Spy Debate, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 23, 2006, at Al.
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can be: President Bush believes if Al Qaeda is calling somebody in
America, it is in our national security interest to know who they're
calling and why.... Some important Democrats clearly disagree."73
The White House calculated that few Americans would question
the legality of the NSA program if the administration made clear
that the program was designed to protect them from terrorists.
74
Having established a plan of action, in late December 2005
President Bush used the White House as a platform to begin the
executive branch's assault on rising congressional unease with the
NSA program.75 He explained in straightforward terms that the
Constitution granted him inherent authority to conduct the pro-
76gram.
Continuing to carry out the President's message, the DOJ in a
December 22, 2005 letter 77 followed suit by formally providing con-
gressional leaders on the intelligence committees a preview of the
legal authorities it identified as supporting the program: (1) Arti-
cle II, Section 2 or the Commander in Chief Clause,7 s and (2) the
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) Statute.79 Ad-
ditionally, the DOJ stressed that the administration continued to
use FISA as "a very important tool" in addressing the terrorist
threat.80
After a short reprieve during the December holidays, in the New
Year the executive branch resumed its defense of the program as
well as its resistance to congressional inquiry into the domestic sur-
veillance program. Both DOJ Inspector General Glenn A. Fine and
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. E.g., Liptak, supra note 22, at A21.
76. Id. ("As president and commander in chief, I have the constitutional responsibility
and the constitutional authority to protect our country. Article II of the Constitution gives
me that responsibility and the authority necessary to fulfill it.").
77. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Jus-
tice, to Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Pat Roberts, Chairman of
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Peter Hoekstra, Vice Chairman of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligeice John D. Rockefeller IV, and Ranking Minority
Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Jane Harman (Dec. 22,
2005) [hereinafter Letter from William E. Moschella], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
agency/doj/fisa/doj 122205.pdf.
78. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See Letter from William E. Moschella, supra note 77, at
2 ("[1]n his capacity as Commander in Chief, the President has the responsibility to protect
the Nation from further attacks, and the Constitution gives him all necessary authority to
fulfill that duty.").
79. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224,
pmbl. (2001) ("[T]he President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter
and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States."). See Letter from Wil-
liam E. Moschella, supra note 77, at 2-3 (asserting that AUMF satisfies the exemption to
FISA procedures set forth in Section 109 of FISA).
80. Letter from William E. Moschella, supra note 77, at 5.
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Department of Defense (DOD) Acting Inspector General Thomas
F. Gimble denied the request of Democrats to investigate the activi-
ties by the NSA."' The NSA also articulated its legal justification for
the program, explaining that former head of the NSA General Mi-
chael V. Hayden had relied on Reagan-era Executive Order 123332
as authority to run the intelligence program until President Bush
signed his own executive order in 200213 specifically permitting the
agency to eavesdrop without warrants on the communications of
individuals inside the United States whom the agency believed had
84links to terrorism.
Despite its concerted efforts to keep executive branch agencies
in line, on January 16, 2006 the administration hit a small road-
block when the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) broke ranks
with the executive branch's party line. 5 The FBI revealed that offi-
cials of the Bureau had complained to the NSA that the program
pointlessly intruded on the privacy of Americans."' One FBI official
suggested that the FBI broke ranks with the executive branch be-
cause it did not want to be the fall agency for the program: "This
wasn't our program.... It's not our mess, and we're not going to
clean it up."'87 Indeed, the FBI official's statement may reflect a lar-
ger turf battle between the FBI and NSA as the bureau struggles to
define its jurisdictional areas post-September lth.
Quickly moving on from the FBI's dissension, three days later the
executive branch once again presented a unified front when the
DOJ released a forty-two page legal analysis report in support of the
NSA domestic surveillance program.8 Challenging the findings of a
81. Letter from Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, Department of Justice, to Zoe Lof-
gren, Democrat Representative (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.house.gov/lofgren/
DOJ-OIG-wiretapping-response.pdf (denying jurisdiction to investigate the NSA program
and referring the Democrats' request for an investigation to the DOJ's Office of Professional
Responsibility); Letter from Thomas F. Gimble, DOD Acting Inspector General, to Zoe
Lofgren, Democrat Representative of the House (Jan. 10, 2006), available at http://
www.house.gov/lofgren/DOD-response-re-NSA-request.pdf (refusing to investigate).
82. Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981).
83. The secret executive order signed by President Bush in 2002 remains classified. See
Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 2, at Al.
84. Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Bush Is Pressed Over New Report on Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 2006, at Al; Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Files Say Agency Initiated Growth of
SpyingEffort, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 4, 2006, at Al.
85. E.g., Lowell Bergman et al., Domestic Surveillance: The Program; Spy Agency Data After
Sept. 11 Led FB.L to Dead Ends, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 17, 2006, at Al.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National
Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006) [hereinafter DOJ Legal Authori-
ties], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/doj01906.pdf; see Eric Lichtblau & James
Risen, Legal Rationale byjustice Dept. on Spying Effort, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 20, 2006, at Al.
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Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, which concluded
that the President's authority to carry out the NSA program may
represent the "lowest ebb" s' of presidential powers, 9 the DOJ
sought to reframe the argument.9' The DOJ's analysis placed the
President at "the zenith" 92 of his powers when he authorized the
93NSA domestic surveillance program.
In furtherance of bolstering the executive branch against out-
side pressures, Vice President Cheney also went on record to gain
public support, stating that the program is "critical to the national
security of the United States."94 To garner key support within Con-
gress, he also gave a closed-door briefing to a "Gang of Eight""5
congressional leaders.9 6
Even as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee Senator Arlen
Specter (R-PA) prepared to hold the first Senate hearings on the
NSA program, in early February 2006, Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) Director PorterJ. Goss and Director of National Intelligence
John D. Negroponte made one last effort to shift the focus away
89. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or im-
plied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts
can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from
acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive
must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our
constitutional system.") (footnotes and citations omitted).
90. Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorneys,
American Law Division, Cong. Res. Serv. 5, 44 (Jan. 5, 2006), available at http://
www.house.gov/lofgren/NSA-final.pdf.
91. See generally DOJ Legal Authorities, supra note 88 (providing legal support for the
NSA domestic surveillance program).
92. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635-36 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("When
the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority
is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate.... A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would
be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude ofjudicial interpreta-
tion and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.")
(footnotes and citations omitted).
93. DOJ Legal Authorities, supra note 88, at 2.
94. Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 88, at Al.
95. National Security Act of 1947 § 503(c) (2), 50 U.S.C. 413b(c)(2) (2003) ("If the
President determines that it is essential to limit access to the finding to meet extraordinary
circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States, the finding may be reported to
the chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence committees,
the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and minority
leaders of the Senate, and such other member or members of the congressional leadership
as may be included by the President.").
96. Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 88, at Al.
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from the impending hearings. 7 Framing the need for the NSA
program in terms of national security, Goss denounced the leaks of
the program, stating that they had caused severe damage to CIA
operations and expressed the desire for a grand jury inquiry.!8
At the Senate hearing on the NSA program conducted on Feb-
ruary 6, 2006, Attorney General Gonzales largely dismissed efforts
by senators to urge the executive branch to engage Congress and
the judiciary in oversight of the program91 Instead, Gonzales main-
tained that the President had legal authority to act as he had, and
remained evasive when asked pointed questions about the pro-
gram.'00 Even when told by Republican senators that they had not
intended to authorize the President to conduct warrantless domes-
tic surveillance with AUMF, Gonzales responded that, regardless of
the senators' intentions, the written letter of AUMF nonetheless
supported the President's actions. 0'
The White House only engaged Congress in minimal oversight af-
ter Chairwoman of the House Intelligence Subcommittee on
Technical and Tactical Intelligence Heather A. Wilson called on the
intelligence committees of both Houses to conduct full investiga-
tions into the program.0 2 The following day on February 8, 2006, the
White House provided a closed-door briefing for the full House In-
telligence Committee and announced that it would brief the Senate
Intelligence Committee the next day.0 3 In addition to providing
briefings to the intelligence committees, the administration also an-
nounced that the DOJ's Office of Professional Responsibility had
started a formal inquiry of internal dissension over the legal founda-
tion of the program within the department.' 4 The investigation was
97. Spencer S. Hsu & Walter Pincus, Goss Says Leaks Have Hurt CIA's Work, Urges Probe;
NSA Eavesdropping Defended at Briefing, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2006, at A3; Eric Lichtblau, Panel
Rebuffed on Documents on U.S. Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at Al.
98. Hsu & Pincus, supra note 97, at A3.
99. Alberto Gonzales, United States Attorney General, Prepared Statement of Hon.
Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States at the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee Hearing on Wartime Executive Power and the NSA's Surveillance Authority (Feb. 6,
2006), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/printtestimony.cfin?id=1 727&wit id=3 936.
100. Domestic Surveillance; Excerpts from Senate Hearing on Eavesdropping Program, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2006, at Al7.
101. Adam Liptak, Domestic Surveillance: The Legal Arguments; In Limelight at Wiretap Hear-
ing: 2 Laws, but Which Should Rule?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2006, at Al.
102. Eric Lichtblau, Republican Who Oversees N.S.A. Calls for Wiretap Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2006, at Al 2.
103. Scott Shane & Eric Lichtblau, Full House Committee Gets Briefing on Eavesdropping,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2006, at A22.
104. Scott Shane & Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. Reviews Role of Its Lawyers in Spying, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, at A30.
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in direct response to a letter sent by Democrats earlier injanuary
2006.'05
While the executive branch seemingly increased its cooperation
with congressional inquiries into the NSA domestic surveillance
program, the administration simultaneously led a behind-the-
scenes effort to derail an investigation by the Senate Intelligence
Committee.' 6 On February 16, 2006, the administration stated that
it would not permit former Attorney General John D. Ashcroft and
Former Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey to testify about
the program's legality before the Senate Intelligence Committee. 7
The White House also started a campaign in favor of Senator Mike
DeWine's (R-OH) proposal, which would exempt the NSA pro-
gram from the FISA court and instead place the program under
the oversight of a small congressional subcommittee.'08
On February 22, 2006, the executive branch once again renewed
its wall of resistance to congressional inquiry.'o On the eve before
intelligence official General Hayden was scheduled to brief the full
House Intelligence Committee on the NSA program, White House
Chief of Staff Andrew Card stopped him."0 Less than a week later,
Attorney General Gonzales sent a letter to Senator Specter, at-
tempting to clarify his testimony from the February 6th hearing."'
He continued to dispute the contention that warrantless surveil-
lance violates statutes of the United States, and assured Senator
Specter that despite the existence of "inadvertent mistakes," there
was "intense oversight both within the NSA and outside that
,,112
agency....
In early March 2006, the Bush administration again skirted the
issue of any purported illegality on its own part and instead refo-
cused the issue on possible criminal wrongdoing by those officials
who had reported the classified NSA program to the media." 3 Ac-
cordingly, the administration launched FBI probes, conducted a
polygraph investigation inside the CIA, and issued warnings from
105. Id.
106. Charles Babington & Carol D. Leonnig, Senate Rejects Wiretapping Probe; But Judge
OrdersJustice Department to Turn Over Documents, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2006, atA6.
107. Id.
108. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Chairman Splits with Bush on Spy Program, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 2006, at Al.
109. T p Bush Aide Is Said to Halt Spy Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at A16.
110. Id.
111. Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States, to Arlen
Specter, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://
wwwwashingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/nationalsecurity/gonazles.letter.pdf.
112. Id. at4.
113. Dan Eggen, Administration Targets Journalists, Government Sources, WASH. POST, Mar.
4, 2006, at Bus. Sec.
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the DOJ, all in an effort to discourage government employees from
serving as media sources.114
The administration also attempted to crack down on the sharing
of any information related to the NSA program, including those
matters that were not classified."5 Nevertheless, just as the FBI had
broken ranks with the unified executive branch, so too did a for-
mer senior national security lawyer at the DOJ."6 Former Associate
Deputy Attorney General David Kris went public on March 9, 2006
with his conclusion that FISA covered the NSA surveillance pro-
gram. 117 He acknowledged that many of the program's facts
remained unknown, but suggested that the surveillance was ulti-
mately "not authorized" by Congress and that statutory law would
not "bear the government's weight."...
Throughout the end of March 2006 as debate raged in the Sen-
ate, the White House pushed its spin machines into full gear to
sway the tide of public opinion. During a speech on March 20,
2006, President Bush reiterated that NSA officials agreed with him
that the FISA process was too "slow and cumbersome," and inap-
propriate for the hot pursuit of terrorists."9 He also assured his
audience that he could keep the NSA program "within the bounds
that it was designed."'20 Suggesting that Democrats were both soft
on terrorism and indecisive, the President noted, "I did notice that
nobody from the Democratic Party has actually stood up and called
for getting rid of the terrorist surveillance program. ... [T]hey
ought to stand up and say the tools we're using to protect the
American people shouldn't be used.' 21 Additionally, the DOJ reit-
erated its strong support of the President's authority to eavesdrop
without warrants. 22 When faced with direct questions from con-





116. Dan Eggen & Walter Pincus, FormerfJustice Dept. Lawyer Critical of Eavesdropping Ra-
tionale, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2006, at Bus. Sec.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. President George W. Bush, Speech Delivered at the City Club of Cleveland, Mar.
20, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dy/content/article/2006/03/
20/AR2006032000762.html.
120. Id.
121. Elisabeth Bumiller, The Struggle for Iraq: The President; Bush Concedes Iraq War Erodes
Political Status, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2006, at Al.
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Although public support for President Bush waned in March
2006,124 and a considerable number of citizens began to push for
his impeachment,2 5 President Bush succeeded in holding off in-
depth congressional inquiry. As Republicans and Democrats gear
up for the 2006 midterm elections, however, the unitary executive
may once again face tough questions from members of Congress,
motivated by their constituents, challenging the legality of the NSA
126
program.
In the interim, the unitary executive wall remains fortified
around President Bush and the NSA domestic surveillance pro-
gram he authorized. Members of Congress, constituents, and the
media may continue to pressure the executive branch to reveal de-
tails of the NSA program, but the administration has thus far
succeeded in derailing such oversight efforts.
B. The Majority Party Approach
While the administration built a unitary executive wall in re-
sponse to the media's revelation of the NSA domestic surveillance
program, congressional oversight by the majority party proved
largely ineffectual. Before the New York Times sounded the fire
alarm, Republican congressional leaders skirted police-patrol over-
sight of the surveillance program.'27 Even after December 2005, the
majority of congressional Republicans rallied around the Presi-
dent, calculating that their constituents would support their
actions. 12 Accordingly, the majority of congressional Republicans
124. Jim VandeHei, Bush Says U.S. Troops May Stay in Iraq Past '08, WASH. POST, Mar. 22,
2006, at Bus. Sec. (stating that less than forty percent of Americans approve of President
Bush and no longer trust him).
125. Michael Powell, In Northeast, a Turn Against the President, WASH. POST, Mar. 25,
2006, at Bus. Sec.
126. E.g., David D. Kirkpatrick & Adam Nagourney, In an Election Year, a Shift in Public
Opinion on the War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2006, at A12. On April 6, 2006, President Bush faced
hostile questioning from members of a bipartisan group during a trip to North Carolina as
part of his campaign to bolster support for the Iraq War. Jim Rutenberg, The Reach of War:
The President; Facing 7ugh Questions, Bush Defends War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006, at A8. Presi-
dent Bush responded by again framing the NSA program in terms of national security,
calling it "a decision I made about protecting this country." Id. He further added, "I'm not
going to apologize for what I did on the terrorist surveillance program." Id.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14. Here, although congressional leaders
learned of the NSA domestic surveillance program back in 2001, Republican members of
Congress declined to take further oversight measures of the executive branch. E.g., Jehl,
supra note 57, at A21.
128. See infra Part III.B.
[VOL. 40:1
The NSA Domestic Surveillance Program
have thus far chosen party loyalty over effective oversight of the
executive branch.12
Varying pressures from constituents may explain why some con-
gressional Republicans chose to minimize congressional oversight
of a Republican president, while others embraced their oversight
duties with vigor. The President exerts considerable external pres-
sure on members of his own party in Congress. 3 For example,
President Bush is the Republican Party's chief election campaigner.
As such, the President commands power because he can grant or
deny his support to a congressional Republican facing reelection.
Constituents, however, also exert a very real pressure on members
of Congress. 3' Unlike the President, voting constituents grant or
deny members of Congress their jobs. When the interests of con-
stituents and those of the President do not align, members of
Congress weigh whether an action will jeopardize theirjob security
before siding with the President.
When the New York Times uncovered the domestic surveillance
program, key Republican senators whose job security was not at
stake were among the first to embrace their oversight duties.
Chairman Specter vowed to hold hearings by the Senate Judiciary
Committee and voiced concern that the program appeared to vio-
late FISA. 132 Following through on his promise and heeding
requests from Democrats, he became the first Republican to hold
hearings on the NSA domestic surveillance program. 3 In prepara-
tion for the February 6, 2006 Judiciary Committee hearing,
3 4
Senator Specter wrote to the first panel witness, Attorney General
Gonzales, advising what he wanted the latter to address in his
opening statement.3  The Senator's questions made clear to the
DOJ that he intended to probe into why the administration had
circumvented the statutory requirement of fully and currently in-
forming congressional intelligence committees of the NSA
program.3 6 At the hearing, Senator Specter urged the Attorney
129. See infra Part II.B.
130. WALTERJ. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 30-31
(5th ed. 2001).
131. Id. at 34.
132. Jehl, supra note 57, atA21.
133. See Lichtblau, supra note 97, at Al.
134. The hearing was entitled "Wartime Executive Power and the NSA's Surveillance
Authority." Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance Authority:
Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., (2006), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hear-
ing.cfm?id=1727.
135. Letter from Arlen Specter, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to Attor-
ney General Alberto R. Gonzales (Jan. 24, 2006), available at http://www.cfr.org/content/
publications/attachments/Letter%20to%2OGonzales.pdf.
136. Id. at 2.
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General to advise the President to seek legal review from the FISA
court.3 7 Taking an active approach to oversight, Senator Specter
would later propose NSA Surveillance Rules in the Senate.
3 8
After considering their constituents' interests, some congres-
sional Republicans facing 2006 midterm elections also chose to
conduct their oversight duties of the NSA program despite White
House pressure not to do so. Those who most effectively broke
with the White House in order to address the interests of their con-
stituents were the chairs of congressional committees. 1SAs one
example, Chairwoman of the House Intelligence Subcommittee on
Technical and Tactical Intelligence Heather A. Wilson (R-NM)
challenged the White House on the NSA issue when she called on
the intelligence committees of both Houses to conduct full investi-
gations into the program.140 When the White House responded by
providing briefings to the intelligence committees, Representative
Wilson took credit for the change in White House policy: "I don't
think the White House would have made the decision that it did
had I not stood up and said, 'You must brief the Intelligence
Committee.' ..4' Republican Senator Lindsey Graham noted that
Representative Wilson's comments represented a growing mutiny
on Capitol Hill and likened the moment to a key time in which
Congress was asserting itself as an equal branch of government:
"This is sort of a Marbury v. Madison moment between the execu-
tive and the legislative branch." 42 Commentators have noted that
Representative Wilson may have been motivated to break ranks
137. Domestic Surveillance; Excerpts from Senate Hearing on Eavesdropping Program, supra
note 100, at A17. In support of Senator Specter's proposal, on March 28, 2006, four former
judges of the FISA court testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that the court
should play a formal role in oversight of the domestic surveillance program. Eric Lichtblau,
Threats and Responses: The Intelligence Court; Judges on Secretive Panel Speak Out on Spy Program,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at A19. The judges also read a letter from Judge James Robertson
who resigned from the FISA court on December 19, 2006 in protest of the executive
branch's circumvention of the court. Id.; Johnston & Lewis, supra note 62, at A20.
138. Charles Babington, Specter Proposes NSA Surveillance Rules, WASH. POST, Feb. 26,
2006, at Bus. Sec. The NSA Surveillance Rules would force the federal government to obtain
permission from the secret court in order to continue warrantless surveillance, and would
bring the program under the authority of FISA. The plan potentially pitted Specter against
the administration, which had endorsed Senator DeWine's rival proposal that exempted the
warrantless surveillance from FISA. Id.; Lictblau, supra note 137, at A19; Eric Lichtblau &
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Accord in House to Hold Inquiry on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006,
at Al.
139. See generally J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control
Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1443, 1446, 1515 (2003).
140. Lichtblau, supra note 102, atA12.
141. White House Changes Course on Spy Briefings, CBSNEWS.coM, Feb. 9, 2006, at http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/08/politics/printable1296837.shtml.
142. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Republican Speaks Up, Leading Others to Challenge Wiretaps, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2006, at Al.
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with the White House because she will face a tough electoral race
against a Democrat in the upcoming midterm elections. 4
In addition to being influenced by constituent and electoral
concerns, some Republicans began to distance themselves from the
Bush administration as the President's ratings fell in order to pre-
serve the appearance of their independence. 44Responding to
accusations that he had succumbed to White House pressure, on
February 17, 2006 Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee
Pat Roberts announced a split with the administration regarding
congressional oversight of the NSA program.' 45 In a move disfa-
vored by the White House, Senator Roberts stated that the
program should come under the authority of the FISA court. 46
Additionally, the House Intelligence Committee agreed to hold a
congressional inquiry into the NSA program. 47 In March 2006,
many Republicans also responded to the shrinking administrative
coattails by challenging the President on national security issues,
most notably the sale of U.S. ports to a United Arab Emirates com-
pany, but also on the NSA program.148
Nonetheless, on the other end of the political spectrum, many
congressional Republicans dismissed their oversight duties. Chair-
man of the House Intelligence Committee Peter Hoekstra did not
hold hearings. 49 Taking a less extreme approach, Chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Committee Roberts initially stated that his
committee would consider further oversight measures.'5 0 Despite
Senator Robert's possible openness to the fire-alarm model, how-
ever, he later shunned his oversight duties when he criticized
inquiries by Democrats into the NSA program as simply serving to
minimize the threat of terrorism. 5' On the eve of the February
hearing, Senator Roberts also wrote to Judiciary Committee leaders
Senator Specter and Senator Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT) to reaffirm
143. Id.; Lichtblau, supra note 102, atAl2.
144. Peter Baker, GOP Unease with Bush Spreads to Security Issues, WASH. POST, Mar. 1,
2006, at Bus. Sec. ("Bush's support among Republicans fell from 83 percent to 72 per-
cent.").
145. Stolberg, supra note 108, at Al.
146. Id.
147. Lichtblau & Stolberg, supra note 138, at Al.
148. Baker, supra note 144, at Bus. Sec. ("Republicans who once marched in lockstep
behind their president on national security are increasingly willing to challenge him in an
area considered his political strength.").
149. Jehl, supra note 57, atA21.
150. Id. ("[I am] currently in discussions with Senate leadership to determine what
form additional oversight should take.").
151. Hsu & Pincus, supra note 97, atA3.
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his strong support for the NSA program and his belief that the
President had been acting within his constitutional authority. '
Using the framing tactic perfected by the executive branch,
many congressional Republicans continued unwaveringly to follow
the President based mainly on his stance on terrorism. Six Repub-
lican senators held a press conference to explain that Congress
need not conduct more oversight into a program that is "absolutely
necessary to prevent another 9/11 catastrophe. 1 53 Senate majority
leader Bill Frist (R-TN) denounced Democratic requests for inves-
tigations into the NSA domestic surveillance program as "stifling
partisanship" and "politically-motivated" moves that threatened
more important committee endeavors dealing with issues involving
the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, as well as the
spread of Islamic radicalism.14 This kind of allegiance caused Vice
Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee John D. Rockefel-
ler IV (D-WV) to accuse Republicans of bowing to White House
pressure and abdicating their oversight duties: "For the past three
years, the Senate intelligence committee has avoided carrying out
its oversight of our nation's intelligence whenever the White House
becomes uncomfortable with the questions being asked. The very
independence of this committee is called into question. 5
After struggling to keep the majority party unified, the agenda
of those congressional Republicans supporting the executive
branch gained traction in March 2006. On March 7, 2006, Senator
Roberts's Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted along
party lines to reject a Democratic proposal to investigate the NSA
domestic surveillance program. 56 Instead, the committee agreed to
appoint a seven-member terrorist surveillance subcommittee. 157
Chairman Roberts called the subcommittee "an accommodation
with the White House" where oversight would be conducted, but
limited. 58 Following the subcommittee's first briefing by the White
House, members remained tight-lipped. The panel's Vice-Chairman
152. Letter from Pat Roberts, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, to Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee Arlen Specter and Minority Ranking
Member Patrick J. Leahy 1 (Feb. 3, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/
2006_cr/roberts020306.pdf.
153. Charles Babington, Lawmakers Urge More Executive Branch Oversight, WASH. POST,
Feb. 3, 2006, at A3 (quoting SenatorJeff Sessions, R-AL).
154. Letter from William H. Frist, M.D., Majority Leader of the Senate, to Harry Reid,
Minority Leader of the Senate (March 3, 2006), available at http://frist.senate.gov/_files/
030306.pdf.
155. Babington & Leonnig, supra note 106, at A6.
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Senator Rockefeller IV commented that the substance of the brief-
ing was "too ... sensitive to talk about." According to the
agreement between the Senate and the White House, the sub-
committee was prohibited from revealing contents of the briefing
even to other members of the intelligence committee."0 This ar-
rangement may fuel animosity between those members who are
and are not privy to the information on the NSA program, and
consequendy hinder the oversight process.
Hoping to settle the debate over the NSA domestic surveillance
program and squash further congressional inquiries, four key Re-
publican senators'6 ' introduced a bill on March 16.162 The Terrorist
Surveillance Act of 2006 ' addresses the agreement announced on
March 7 by the Senate Intelligence Committee and calls for an in-
telligence subcommittee of seven members who would oversee the
NSA domestic surveillance program. 64 Senator Specter reacted an-
grily to the proposal, arguing that it let "the government 'do
whatever the hell it wants' for 45 days without seeking judicial or
congressional approval."1"
In the end, the call to fall in line with party politics has proven
more persuasive to congressional Republicans than calls by their
constituents to embrace their constitutional duty to oversee the
executive branch. Despite the strong efforts by certain Republicans
such as Senator Specter and Representative Wilson, Republican
attempts at oversight of the administration's NSA program have
failed effectively to penetrate the unitary executive.
C. The Minority Party Approach
Responding to the report by the New York Times in December
2005, Democrats immediately mobilized against the Bush
159. Walter Pincus, Panel on Eavesdropping Briefed by White House, WASH. POST, Mar. 10,
2006, at Bus. Sec.
160. Charles Babington, Intelligence Panel Riven by Infighting, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2006,
at Bus. Sec.
161. Senator DeWine, Senator Graham, Senator Hagel, and Senator Snowe.
162. Charles Babington, GOP Plan to Allow Warrantless Spying Would Bring Surveillance
Under Review, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2006, at Bus. Sec.
163. Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006, S._, 109th Cong. (2006).
164. Babington, supra note 162, at Bus. Sec. The bill would allow warrantless wiretap-
ping for up to forty-five days per case. After forty-five days, the DOI would seek a warrant
from the FISA court, drop the surveillance, or convince members of Congress that despite
insufficient evidence for a warrant, surveillance was "necessary to protect the United States."
Id. The bill would also impose fines up to $1 million and/or prison terms tip to fifteen years
for those who leak sensitive information about the program. Id.
165. Id.
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administration. Nevertheless, they gained little by this fast
response. Although the administration told select leaders of the
Democratic Party about the program in 2001, most minority party
members heard about the program when it was revealed to the
public. '66 Media persistence, fueled by public outcry, helped keep
the issue in the news, but Democrats were unable to capitalize on
this attention. Even though the NSA program was politically
volatile for both parties and its resolution had the potential
significantly to alter the landscape of the 2006 midterm elections,
1 67
the administration's executive wall and Republican acquiescence
have thus far proven fatal to the Democratic Party's calls for
oversight.
The minority party possesses, by definition, limited political
power. Thus, Democrats had unique concerns with respect to
choosing an oversight model and allocating their political re-
sources. The Democrats could, and arguably should, have more
effectively patrolled the NSA program before the New York Times
sounded the fire alarm. Examples of potential police-patrol devices
include: calling meetings with administration officials, writing
more pointed and frequent letters from Democratic leaders to
administration officials, conducting hearings about the NSA or the
program itself, or threatening budget support until the details of
the program are clarified. Without the political capital to make the
majority or the administration respond to their inquiries, however,
the potential impact of police patrol was extremely limited.
Few police-patrol devices were employed with respect to the NSA
program. Instead, the minority seemed cognizant of the potentially
grave consequences of breaking with the administration on an issue
framed in the guise of national security. Minority leaders knew about
the NSA surveillance program in 2001, but only three of the seven
who were previously informed expressed concern about the pro-
gram before the December 2005 revelation.'6 The limited police-
patrol oversight before the New York Times article included con-
cerned letters from two of the party leaders, Senator Rockefeller
and Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), and alarmed comments
from a third, Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD). Senator Rockefeller's
2003 letter to Vice President Cheney said that the high security of
the program raised "profound oversight issues."' 69 His premoni-
166. SeeJehl, supra note 57, at A21.
167. Kirkpatrick& Nagourney, supra note 126, atA12.
168. Jehl, supra note 57, atA21.
169. Charles Hurt, Roberts 'Puzzled'by Rockefeller's Concerns, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2005,
atA3.
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tions were correct; the program continued long into 2005 before
any public oversight was conducted.
7
Once the New York Times sounded the alarm, Democrats initi-
ated their offensive with requests for investigative oversight. Four
days after the initial report, Democrats of the House led by Repre-
sentative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) wrote a letter to the DOD, DOJ, and
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) requesting that they
each conduct investigations into the domestic surveillance pro-
gram. '71 Specifically, the Democrats asked the departments to
investigate alleged violations of FISA and the misuse of appropri-
ated funds.'7 2 Democratic Representative Rush Holt (D-NJ) also
requested the NSA to suspend the domestic surveillance program
until Congress completed its review. 7" Their requests were ulti-
mately uniformly rejected."
74
Not dissuaded by executive branch resistance, the Democrats
continued pushing for meaningful investigative oversight of the
program by scheduling unofficial hearings. 7 5 There, Democrat
leader Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) voiced his party's intention to
conduct congressional oversight:
The administration's latest justification for circumventing the
law to spy on Americans falls far short of answering the many
questions Congress and the American people have about this
activity. That is why there have been bipartisan calls for ad-
ministration officials to come to Congress to answer questions
and ensure that the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees
can thoroughly investigate the administration's actions. 176
170. Id. Senator Pat Roberts, Chairman of the Senate Select Subcommittee on Intelli-
gence, told the press that there had been "many briefings" between the administration and
both parties in Congress abott the NSA program, but none were held in public. There is no
evidence of other oversight activities conducted before disclosure of the NSA program in
the New York Times in December 2005.
171. Letter from Zoe Lofgren et al., Democrat Members of the House, to DOD Acting
Inspector General Thomas F. Gimble, DOJ Inspector General Glenn A. Fine, and GAO
Comptroller General David M. Walker (Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/
lofgren/NSA-espionage-letter-revised.pdf.
172. Id.
173. Letter from Rush Holt, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy, to
NSA Director Keith B. Alexander (Dec. 22, 2005).
174. Letter from Glenn A. Fine, supra note 81; Letter from Thomas F. Gimble, supra
note 81; Letter from Gloria L.Jarmon, Managing Director Congressional Relations, General
Accounting Office, to Zoe Lofgren et al., Democratic Members of the House (Feb. 7, 2006),
available at http://www.house.gov/lofgren/GAOresponse.pdf.
175. Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 88, at Al.
176. Id. (quoting Senator Harry Reid).
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Because Democrats lacked the authority to hold their own offi-
cial hearings in either house of Congress, they lobbied the majority
party for additional oversight of the NSA surveillance program. On
January 27, 2006, Representative Lofgren wrote to the Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing & Terror-
ism Risk Assessment, and urged him not to shirk from his oversight
duties: "To date, the Intelligence Subcommittee, which has the au-
thority to look into these matters, has not provided that
oversight."17 She underscored the minority party's dependence on
the majority party to ensure proper oversight:
As Ranking Member, I have only the power to suggest a
course of action to you. I call on you to schedule hearings
immediately on these matters. Only by addressing these issues
forcefully, and in a timely manner, will we truly serve as an in-
dependent and co-equal branch of government that inspires
faith and confidence in our democratic society.1
7 8
In the Senate, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) also requested
that Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee Specter "take all
appropriate steps, including subpoenas" 79 to gain congressional
access to DOJ legal opinions supporting the NSA program.
The Democrats approached oversight hearings with a message
unified in its criticism of the administration yet strong on national
security.' 80 Senator Reid, as party leader, issued a memorandum
describing the target themes for the minority during the hearings.
Throughout the ensuing hearings, the Democrats stayed on mes-
sage: "[Democrats are] unwavering in their commitment to
protecting our security and protecting the rule of law, for all his
tough talk, President Bush's policies have made America less se-
cure."' 8' The coordinated message was designed to walk the line for
senators who needed to look tough on national security for the
2006 midterm elections without "paint[ing] wiretapping as inher-
ently evil." 82
177. Letter from Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Intelli-
gence, Information Sharing & Terrorism Risk Assessment, to Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing & Terrorism Risk Assessment Rob
Simmons (Jan. 27, 2006), available at http://www.house.gov/lofgren/simmons-on-NSA-
spying.pdf.
178. Id. at 2.
179. Babington. supra note 153, atA3.
180. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Domestic Surveillance: The Democrats; Balancing Act by Democrats
at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2006, at Al7.
181. Id. (quoting Senator Harry Reid memorandum).
182. Id.
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Eventually, the Democrats' persistence and unified message suc-
ceeded and the administration began cooperating on a limited
basis. In addition to providing briefings to the intelligence commit-
tees, the administration also announced that the DOJ's Office of
Professional Responsibility had started a formal inquiry into the
internal dissension over the legal foundation of the program
within the department.
3 The investigation was in direct response"
4
to a letter sent by Democrats earlier in January 2006, asking the
DOJ to reconsider its decision not to investigate.'85 Senator Leahy
welcomed the investigation with the caveat that it was no substitute
for "strong Congressional oversight. """'
As the Republicans jockeyed with various proposals to oversee
the NSA domestic surveillance program, s7 the Democrats pushed
for investigative oversight using more aggressive and defiant strate-
gies. In the Senate, Democrats refused to vote on Republican
proposed legislation without knowing more facts about the pro-
gram."' In the House, Representative Lofgren and seventeen other
members of Congress called for the President to appoint a special
counsel to investigate the warrantless surveillance.' ' Their letter
questioned the legality of the surveillance and noted that oversight
in the House was limited to reviewing reports of the press.11' The
confusion of all eighteen members was clear as they detailed factual
questions about "operational details" that were never clarified in
either Attorney General Gonzales's memorandum about the pro-
gram or his later testimony in committee. 101 They lambasted
Gonzales for stating that he would only be addressing "activities
confirmed publicly by the President"; interpreting his comment as
implying that there was additional, non-public surveillance that the
administration was hiding.'9 2 The letter cited multiple examples
183. Hurt, supra note 169, at A3 (discussing briefings by the administration to the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence); Shane & Lichtblau, supra note 104, at A30
(discussing the formal inquiry).
184. Id.
185. Letter from Zoe Lofgren et al., Democratic Members 6f the House, to DOJ Inspec-
tor General Glenn A. Fine (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.house.gov/lofgren/NSA-
follow-up.pdf.
186. Shane & Lichtblau, supra note 104, atA30.
187. Stolberg, supra note 108, at Al.
188. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & David E. Sanger, Facing Pressure, White House Seeks Approval for
Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, atA9.
189. Letter from Zoe Lofgren et al., Democratic Members of the House, to President
George W. Bush (Feb. 26, 2006), available at http://www.house.gov/lofgren/022406-nsa-
spec-counsel-letter.pdf. (calling for a special counsel investigation into the NSA surveillance
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where the administration failed to initiate investigations or re-
spond to Congressional inquiries,"19 and concluded that the
"pattern of resistance" required a special counsel to investigate the
allegations.1
94
The partisan animosity rose to a furor when, on March 13, 2006,
Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) departed from the unified front and
called for a censure of the President.' 95 The move garnered limited
Democratic support, 196 even though many Democrats supported
Feingold's assertion that Bush had abused his authority with re-
spect to the NSA program.' 97 Other Democrats accused Feingold, a
potential nominee for President in 2008, of political grandstand-
ing. "At a time when Democrats had Bush on the ropes over Iraq,
the budget and port security, Feingold single-handedly turned the
debate back to an issue where Bush [had] the advantage and drove
another wedge through his party."'9 For their part, some Republi-
cans considered the move a "political fumble""9 and generally
echoed the comments that Feingold was making a "political
ploy."
200
Sensing that the wave of public outcry was ebbing, Democrats
launched an all-out attack on the administration's security policies,
hoping to revitalize their unified message and capitalize on the
President's dwindling polling numbers .20' The attack began with
Senator Charles E. Schumer's (D-NY) bill that would put all law-
suits challenging the NSA wiretapping program on the fast track to
the Supreme Court.2 It ended with a Senate Judiciary Committee
193. Both the DOD and the DOJ refused to investigate. The DOJ's Inspector General
cited a lack of jurisdiction on matters of "legal advice" and the DOD claimed it was already
investigating the program but cited only a long-standing audit to support the claim. The
GAO also refised to investigate stating that the program was designated as foreign or coun-
terintelligence and was thus outside of its statutory authority. Letter from Zoe Lofgren et al.,
supra note 189.
194. Id.
195. See Charles Babington, Feingold Pushes to Censure President, WASH. POST, Mar. 14,
2006, at Bus. Sec.
196. Only two Democrats in the Senate supported censuring the President, though
other minority members said that the motion was premature and that they would not rule
out a later vote against the President. FredricJ. Frommer, Associated Press Writer, Feingold's
Censure Call Gives Him Boost, ABCNEWS.GO.COM, Mar. 26, 2006, available at http://
abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=1769688&CM P=OTC-RSSFeedsO312.
197. Dana Milbank, The Feingold Resolution and the Sound of Silence, WASH. POST, Mar. 15,
2006, at Bus. Sec.
198. Id.
199. Frommer, supra note 196.
200. Shailagh Murray, Senate Maverick's Motion Stirs Angry Debate, WASH. POST, Mar. 15,
2006, at Bus. Sec.
201. Steven R. Weisman, Democrats Opening Assault on Bush Security Policies, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2006, at Al8.
202. Editorial, Bill Would Speed Challenge to Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, atA16.
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hearing on the motion for censure where former Nixon counsel
John Dean testified about why George W. Bush should be cen-
sured . The hearing received little support or attention, however,
and several of Senator Feingold's Democratic colleagues did not
even attend the hearing on the motion.204 Although the hearing
persuaded one more Democrat to support censure,2 0 5 it did little to
bolster the party's faltering message. Ultimately, like many of the
arguments at the hearing, the Democrats' attempts to raise fire-
alarm oversight continue to fall on deaf ears.
D. Interest Groups
The success of the decentralized fire-alarm model of oversight
primarily depends on interest groups to sound the alarm. Here,
the media, multiple interest groups, and academics joined Con-
gress in questioning and challenging the NSA surveillance
program. Without the involvement of those groups, any public ac-
knowledgment of the NSA program likely would not have
occurred.2 °6
The media, more than any other group, pulled the alarm that
ignited the nation's attention. For its investigation, the New York
Times spoke to "[n]early a dozen current and former officials" on
an anonymous basis "because of the classified nature of the
program. '' 207 The administration exerted enormous pressure to
keep the NSA program a secret and administration officials
successfully delayed publication of the article for a year after the
New York Times had the story.208 Thus, although plenty of
individuals within the intelligence community and elsewhere had
"concerns about the operation's legality and oversight,, 206 it took
two reporters more than a year to gather enough facts and
203. An Examination of the Call to Censure the President: Hearing on S.R 398 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Mar. 31, 2006), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.c fm?id=1841&witid-5218.
204. Dana Milbank, Like a Bad Dream, Watergate Comes Back, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2006, at
Bus. Sec.
205. See Charles Babington, Leahy Says Bush Deserves Censure for Wiretap Actions, WASH.
POST, Apr. 1, 2006, at Bus. Sec.
206. The White House and certain members of both congressional parties knew about
the NSA surveillance program four years before the New York Times revealed the program
in December 2005. SeeJehl, supra note 57, at A21.
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evidence to break the story.210 Since December 2005, the New York
Times and other media organizations have been at the forefront of
the battle-asking questions of officials, recording objections both
in the judicial system and in various legal communities, and
keeping discussion about the program public. When a single party
controls the White House and Congress, the ongoing efforts of the
media to keep the issue in the public consciousness may serve as
the only meaningful form of oversight of the surveillance program.
On the judicial front, civil rights attorneys began to poke holes
in the administration's unitary front. The American Civil Liberties
Union, among other groups," filed suit in the Eastern District of
Michigan on behalf of 'journalists, authors, scholars and organiza-
tions," naming the NSA and its director as defendants. 21 2 The
complaint alleged that the program has violated both the First and
Fourth Amendments because of its chilling effect on speech and
213
privacy, and on separation of powers grounds. A federal district
court agreed with the ACLU and ruled in August 2006 that the
program was unconstitutional and ordered the wiretapping to
cease.2 " The Center for Constitutional Rights ("CCR") also filed a
separate suit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of "cli-
ents who fit the criteria described by the attorney general for
targeting" under the surveillance program.2 " The CCR complaint
requested an immediate injunction against the President's surveil-
lance program based on the allegation that the program has
violated FISA.215 Both the threat of ongoing litigation, and rulings
210. See id. Even though several members of Congress privately objected to the pro-
gram, none took the information public, ostensibly out of concern for national security. See
supra Part III.C and text accompanying notes 168-170. The two New York Times Reporters,
James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, later received on April 18, 2006, the Pulitzer Prize for their
coverage of the NSA surveillance program. Katharine Q. Seelye, Two Awards for Public Service
After Katrina's Onslaught Lead the Pulitzers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2006, at B7.
211. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at paras. 3-6, American Civil Lib-
erties Union v. National Security Agency (E.D. Mich. 2006) [hereinafter Complaint],
available at http://www.aclu.org/images/nsaspying/asset.upload-filel37-23491.pdf. The
ACLU filed the complaint on behalf of the ACLU, the ACLU Foundation, the ACLU of
Michigan, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Council on American-
Islamic Relations ("CAIR"), the CAIR of Michigan, Greenpeace, and select journalists, au-
thors, editors and academics. Id. paras 5-18.
212. Two Groups Sue Over NSA Wiretap Program, CNN.coM, Jan. 17, 2006, http://
www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/01 /17/aclu.nsa.
213. Complaint, supra note 211, paras. 2-3.
214. Dan Eggan & Dafna Linzer, Judge Rules Against Wiretaps; NSA Program Called Uncon-
stitutiona WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2006, at Al.
215. Two Groups Sue Over NSA Wiretap Program, supra note 212.
216. Complaint for Injunctive Relief at para. I and "Prayer for Relief," Center for Con-
stitutional Rights v. George W. Bush (S.D.N.Y 2006) (No. 06-CV-00313), available at
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/govt.misconduct/do cs/NSAcomplaintFINAL11706.pdf.
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like that in the ACLU case, keep pressure on the administration to
continue releasing details about the program.
Additionally, private actors started turning to the judicial system
for relief shortly after the civil rights interest groups filed suit. In
February 2006, the AI-Haramain Islamic Foundation, an Islamic
charity, sued the administration in the U.S. District Court in Port-
land.217 The suit alleged that conversations between the charity's
leaders and its lawyers have been illegally wiretapped.28 The Is-
lamic charity has sought one million dollars in damages.' The
charity has claimed that the NSA has failed to follow procedures
mandated by FISA by failing to obtain a court order authorizing
electronic surveillance. 220 The suit has also named the U.S. Office
of Foreign Assets Control as complicit for relying on the illegally-
obtained information from the NSA to designate the charity as a
"specially designated global terrorist" in September 2004.2 Several
suits have now been filed by purported targets of the surveillance,
signaling that public patience with the administration's explana-
222tions is waning.
On the public relations front, interest groups sought to rally their
constituencies through policy statements on the Internet. The
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), for example, has devoted a
segment of its web site to the surveillance program. " The EFF site
encourages visitors to the site to contact their congressional
representatives and telecommunications providers to contest the
program, and are told that the EFF "believes the program violates
the Fourth Amendment, FISA, the Wiretap Act, and most likely the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Moreover, it is neither
authorized nor justified by the Constitutional power of the
executive."2 4 National Public Radio has followed suit and has






222. Carol D. Leonnig & Mary Beth Sheridan, Saudi Group Alleges Wiretapping ty U.S.,
WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2006, at Bus. Sec. ("Several targets of government terrorism prosecu-
tions have challenged the warrantless eavesdropping in courts nationwide since news reports
in December revealed the existence of the secret surveillance program."); see, e.g., Com-
plaint for Damages, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at paras. 2-8, Hepting v. AT&T Corp.
(N.D. Mich. 2006), available at http://Aww.eff.org/legal/cases/att/att-complaint.pdf. The
Electronic Frontier Foundation filed the complaint on behalf of a class of American citizens
who subscribed to AT&T telephone services and alleged that AT&T assisted the government
in collecting information about its subscribers. Id. paras. 13-30.
223. Elec. Frontier Found., Ek:. The NSA Warrantless Domestic Surveillance, http://
www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/NSA/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2006).
224. Id.
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created a section of its site devoted to articles, commentary, and
news programs about the surveillance program."'
When evaluating the strength of the DOJ and administration's
226ilegal arguments, legal scholars have varied in their conclusions.
One scholar has posited that the program "is probably constitu-
tional" though it "probably violates the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. 22' 7 Another has found that the arguments "are
weak to the point of being frivolous." 228 Specifically in response to
the administration's reliance on AUMF, one scholar has noted that
"[n]o fair-minded person can read an authorization to use military
force as authority to go off and do domestic spying. ,229 Another
scholar has likened the administration's arguments to a slippery
slope: "If the authorization of military force empowered the presi-
dent to do something as far removed from fighting a war as this,
does it authorize the president to violate any conceivable law to
fight terrorism?"230 Constitutional law scholars and former govern-
ment officials also wrote to members of Congress on January 9,
2006, stating that the DOJ failed to identify "any plausible legal au-
thority for such surveillance" and that the program "appears on its
face to violate existing law."23 According to their legal analysis,
Congress expressly prohibited domestic surveillance by the NSA in
FISA, and did not inherently authorize the President to authorize
the program through AUMF.
232
Interest groups may ultimately be fighting the wrong battle. The
ability of the media to keep the NSA surveillance issue alive de-
pends, in part, on continuing congressional activity. When that
activity wanes, or the public loses interest because other stories
break in the headlines,233 the media's role in oversight diminishes.
Although several groups have mobilized in the courts, none have
directly lobbied congressional leaders to the point where the ma-
jority party feels a mandate to conduct oversight of the NSA
225. Nat'l Pub. Radio, NPR:. The Debate Over Domestic Surveillance, http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=51 70376 (last visited Apr. 12, 2006).
226. Liptak, supra note 22, at A21.
227. Id. (quoting Orin S. Kerr, law professor at George Washington University).
228. Id. (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, law professor at Duke University).
229. Id. (quoting Eric M. Freedman, law professor at Hofstra University).
230. Id. (quoting Daniel J. Solove, law professor at George Washington University).
231. Letter from Curtis A. Bradley et al., scholars of constitutional law and former gov-
ernment officials, to Bill Frist et al., members of Congress 2 (Jan. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.nsa watch.org/DOJ.Response.AUMEfinal.pdf.
232. Id. at 3-6.
233. For example, the public's interest in the NSA surveillance program waned when
Vice President Cheney accidentally shot seventy-eight year-old Austin lawyer Harry Whitting-
ton while quail hunting. Shailagh Murray & Peter Baker, Cheney Accidentally Sprays Hunting
Companion with Birdshot, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2006, at Bus. Sec.
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surveillance program. Instead, those groups have used the Inter-
net, the media, and the courts peripherally to mount an attack.
Ironically, academic critics, who arguably possess minimal political
leverage, appear to be the only figures who have lobbied Congress
directly.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
A. Lessons from the Fire-Alarm Model of Oversight
The President has capitalized on his party's control of the execu-
tive and the legislative branches. In a one-party government, the
party in power decides which executive branch actions require
strident oversight. The minority party, as evidenced by its inability
to initiate meaningful police-patrol oversight of the NSA program,
must wait until the fire alarm sounds. Congress tends to initiate
oversight when executive actions violate legislative goals or harm
potential constituents. 23 ' The decision to launch oversight in a one-
party government, however, requires that delegates weigh the
benefits of oversight against the potential costs of challenging the
party in power. Thus far, the costs have outweighed the benefits
and little meaningful oversight has occurred.235 The blame, it ap-
pears, can be laid at the door of one-party government.2
Members of Congress face a complicated calculus when making
oversight decisions. On the one hand, Democrats must carefully
select those battles that they wage against the Republicans and the
President, knowing that because of their minority status, they will
incur substantial costs for relatively minor gains in oversight. Con-
gress faces many complex and urgent issues, including among
others, whether the President lied about intelligence supporting
the decision to go to war in Iraq, management of the so-called
"War on Terror," the Iraqi prison abuse scandal, and recovery from
Katrina and preparations for a new hurricane season. Minority
members have limited leverage with which they can force issues
under the oversight microscope, and limited time to make their
impact because the public has a short attention span. Additionally,
234. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 168.
235. See Nather, supra note 15, at 1190 (quoting Representative David R. Obey (D-WI),
the ranking Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee, "[i]n this Congress, there
are no checks, there are no balances. There is no oversight.").
236. Id. at 1194 ("Within Congress, one-party government gets much of the blame for
the breakdowns. Lawmakers from both parties, as well as outside analysts, agree that one-
party government is a recipe for weaker oversight, and this Congress is no exception.").
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because the administration informed certain Democratic leaders
about the surveillance in 2001 and those leaders did not sound the
alarm, the party faces an uphill battle arguing that the NSA pro-
gram now warrants comprehensive oversight. 238 Despite the
repeated requests of Democrats for hearings and investigations,
the Republicans have almost uniformly rejected calls for over-
sight.239 Thus, minority members have learned that they simply do
not possess enough leverage to push for comprehensive and mean-
ingful oversight of the NSA surveillance program.
Republicans, on the other hand, are "not impermeable to pres-
sures from other governmental and nongovernmental forces."
2 40
Despite their majority status, Republican members of Congress
must decide if constituent interest in oversight of the NSA surveil-
lance program is strong enough to outweigh the substantial
political costs of challenging the President. Thus far, most Repub-
licans have decided that challenging the President in an election
year jeopardizes the support of the Republican base, and have
therefore conducted little meaningful oversight.24' Republican reti-
cence to challenge the surveillance program may be symptomatic
of a downward trend in congressional oversight during the Bush
administration. 42 Indeed, in 2004, one commentator noted that
there was "mounting evidence that the oversight process has been
faltering on some of the most urgent issues before Congress."
243
Republican inaction does not, however, come without potential
costs. Majority leaders know that broadening executive power can
produce long-term ramifications, particularly if a Democrat takes
the White House in 2008.TM
Senator Specter appears to be the only majority leader pushing
for meaningful oversight of the NSA surveillance program, and his
237. Jehl, supra note 57, atA21.
238. See Karen Tumulty & Mike Allen, Bush Says, Bring It On; The Critics Will, TIME, Jan.
9, 2006, at 28 ("G.O.P. strategists argue that Democrats have little leeway to attack on the
issue because it could make them look weak on national security and because some of their
leaders were briefed about the the [sic] National Security Agency (NSA) no-warrant surveil-
lance before it became public knowledge.").
239. See supra Part III.C.
240. OLESZEK, supra note 130, at 2. The executive branch, the media, congressional
members' constituents, and lobbying groups influence congressional decision-making by
applying pressure for policy changes. Id.
241. See supra Part III.B.
242. See Susan Milligan, Congress Reduces its Oversight Role Since Clinton, A Change in Focus,
B. GLOBE, Nov. 20, 2005, at Al.
243. Nather, supra note 15, at 1192.
244. Tumulty, supra note 238, at 28 ("[Elven if Republicans are prepared to bless Bush's
program, they know it theoretically would have to mean extending such sweeping Executive
power to, say, a President Hillary Clinton.").
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efforts have come at substantial political cost."' First, the majority
party does not appear to support Senator Specter's proposal, un-
der which the FISA court would determine the constitutionality of
the surveillance program.24" Instead, the administration and several
majority members favor Senator Mike DeWine's more lenient pro-
posal.47 Senator DeWine's bill would authorize the NSA to conduct
warrantless electronic surveillance for forty-five days; if there were
not enough evidence to obtain a FISA warrant at that point, the
administration could obtain approval from a panel of the Senate
Intelligence Committee to continue surveillance.24" Second, Sena-
tor Specter's threat to limit funding for the NSA if the
administration continues to withhold information on the surveil-
lance program has drawn sharp criticism from other majority
members.4 '1
The uncertain legal standing of the surveillance program also
presents a significant challenge to congressional oversight. Ultimate
jurisdiction over the legal question of whether FISA unconstitu-
tionally limits the President's inherent power rests with the
Supreme Court.2 5" If the President believes that a statute unconsti-
tutionally limits his inherent powers and he believes that his
actions would be supported by the Court, the President could defy
245. See, eg., Seth Stern, On Many Fronts, Specters GOP Support Thin, CONG. Q. TODAY,
Mar. 31, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 5733459 ("[A] paucity of GOP support for one of the
Pennsylvania Republican's priorities has become a pattern in his second year as chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee. Specter also has battled against many in his party this year
on an asbestos trust fund proposal, and on oversight of intelligence programs. Few, if any,
Judiciary Republicans supported his approach to any of these high-profile issues. Others in
the caucus.., tried to derail them.").
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See Pincus, supra note 156, at Bus. Sec.
249. Martin Sieff, Specter May Block Funds for Wiretaps, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Mar. 8, 2006,
http://www.upi.com/SecufityTerrorism/view.p hp?StorylD=20060308-113950-1456r (on file
with the University of Michigan journal of Law Reform) ("Specter's comments drew a re-
buke from Senate Transportation-Treasury Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman
Christopher Bond, R-Mo. 'I would just say to my good friend from Pennsylvania I hope we
don't do something like cut off the ability of our NSA to intercept calls from al-Qaida,' Bond
said. ' .. I hope that we don't do anything like that.' ").
250. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General to the Honorable
AbnerJ. Mikva, Counsel to the President, Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Un-
constitutional Statutes (Nov. 2, 1994), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/nonexcut.htm ("The
Supreme Court plays a special role in resolving disputes about the constitutionality of en-
actments. As a general matter, if the President believes that the Court would sustain a
particular provision as constitutional, the President should execute the statute, notwith-
standing his own beliefs about the constitutional issue. If, however, the President, exercising
his independent judgment, determines both that a provision would violate the Constitution
and that it is probable that the Court would agree with him, the President has the authority
to decline to execute the statute.").
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the statute and prepare a defense."' The DOJ has consistently
maintained that the President has inherent power to order and
conduct surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.5  Several
district courts across the country are currently reviewing a different
but related issue, namely whether FISA authorizes the surveillance
that the NSA program encompasses.2 3 The battle in the courtroom
may be over before the 2006 midterm election has passed, and with
it, the opportunity for Democrats to make an issue of the NSA pro-
gram in the hopes of regaining control in one or both houses.54
Additionally, the administration's efforts to frame the surveillance
program as critical to national security presents another obstacle to
effective oversight. Public opinion polls indicate that a "slim majority
of Americans are willing to tolerate eavesdropping without warrants
to fight terrorism, but more are concerned that the aggressive anti-
terrorism programs championed by the Bush administration are en-
croaching on civil liberties." 255 The administration's strategy has
included portraying rogue members of Congress as "soft on terror-
ism. '2 6 The President has even declared that the program makes it
"more likely that killers like these 9/11 hijackers will be identified
and located in time." 5 7 The administration's strategy of framing the
surveillance program within the national security and September
251. Id.; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952)
(Jackson,J, concurring).
252. Chitra Ragavan, The Letter of the Law: The White House Says Spying on Tero Suspects
Without Court Approval Is Ok. What About Physical Searches?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 27,
2006, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060327/27fbi.htm ("[I]n a little-
noticed white paper submitted by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to Congress on Janu-
ary 19 justifying the legality of the NSA eavesdropping, Justice Department lawyers made a
tacit case that President Bush also has the inherent authority to order such physical
searches. In order to fulfill his duties as commander in chief, the 42-page white paper says,
'[A] consistent understanding has developed that the president has inherent constitutional
authority to conduct warrantless searches and surveillance within the United States for for-
eign intelligence purposes.'").
253. See supra Part III.D.
254. See, e.g., Lichtblau, supra note 102, at A12 (stating that "some Republicans say they
are concerned that prolonged public scrutiny of the surveillance program could prove a
distraction in this year's midterm Congressional elections.").
255. Adam Nagourney & Janet Elder, Polls Show Ambivalence on Wiretaps, INT'L HERALD
TkitB.,Jan. 28, 2006, at 3.
256. Maureen Dowd, G.O.P to W: You're Nuts!, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at A19 ("For
four years, the White House has accused anyone in Congress or the press who defended civil
liberties or questioned anything about the Iraq war of being soft on terrorism."); see also ABC
News: Bush Campaign Ad Politics or Propaganda? (ABC television broadcast Nov. 21, 2003)
(transcript on file with LEXIS ABC News Transcripts) ("The Republican National Commit-
tee has produced a very tough political ad, which will potentially make an already bitter
debate about war in Iraq and the campaign against terrorism even more so.... The ad
seems to suggest that if you are tough on the president, or criticize the war in Iraq, you may
be soft on terrorism.").
257. Tumulty, supra note 238, at 28.
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11 th contexts has therefore drastically increased the potential cost of
challenging the surveillance program.
Congress has been daunted and arguably defeated by the ad-
ministration's oversight obstacles. The fire alarm was sounded on
the NSA surveillance program, but the model has proven ineffec-
tive against one-party control.
B. Alternatives and Suggestions for Improvement
Congress possesses many alternatives to the fire-alarm model for
conducting oversight,259 but members of Congress are unlikely to
use these methods unless they somehow advance the goals of the
party in power. As the 2006 midterm elections approach and De-
mocrats seek to shift the balance of power in their favor, they
should seek to mobilize interest groups and their political con-
stituencies to press for answers about the NSA surveillance
program. Rather than using the most politically contentious meth-
ods of oversight, such as censure or calling for an independent
counsel, minority members need to find creative approaches to
oversight that may allow both parties to benefit.
Bipartisanship often works most effectively when the goals of the
majority and minority align. For example, Congress held hearings
about the intelligence leading to the Iraq war arguably because both
parties stood to gain political ground.2 ' With the NSA surveillance
program, however, the administration has polarized the issue by
framing it in terms of national security. This approach plays on
public fears of terrorism and targets those who seek to challenge
the authority of the administration. If Democrats could successfully
reframe the issue in a way that serves the political agenda of the
majority, they could potentially achieve greater oversight of the
NSA program.
Democrats and Republicans, however, are more likely to reach
consensus on approaches that quietly conduct oversight. Democ-
rats have had limited success with oversight that produces enough
information to respond to constituent concerns, but simultane-
ously limits public review of the administration's actions. Recently,
for example, the White House quietly extended briefings about the
258. Stolberg, supra note 180, at A17 ("Democrats... could pay a large price-though a
political one-if they do not strike the right tone in the debate over the National Security
Agency's domestic eavesdropping program.").
259. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
260. Republicans wanted to divert attention away from the administration, and Democ-
rats saw any oversight as a political victory.
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surveillance to eleven additional members of the House and six
additional members of the Senate intelligence committees. 26' Un-
der the new briefing arrangement, the White House still controls
the dissemination of information and limits the number of people
with detailed knowledge of the NSA program. Yet the expanded
briefings constitute a win for both parties. Democrats can point to
the extended briefings as proof that their efforts have resulted in
expanded oversight and a deeper understanding of the NSA pro-
gram. The briefings have also placated Republican detractors by
providing operational information about the NSA program. 62
Classified programs pose peculiar issues with respect to over-
sight. Most traditional methods of formal oversight-hearings,
investigations, and adjusting appropriations-are successful be-
cause of their public nature, particularly when Congress uses them
in response to a fire alarm.263 In the case of the NSA program, the
system broke down both before and after the media sounded the
fire alarm. Congressional leaders of both parties failed to object in
any meaningful way when the administration informed them of the
program in 2001.264 The administration also alerted the two presid-
ing judges of the FISA court to the existence of the program, but
the judges failed to take any action or consult with their col-
leagues. 6" Subsequent efforts at oversight have been quashed by
the majority,266 and debate over the surveillance program is slowly
dying down.
Members of Congress must seek more effective means to moni-
tor and challenge executive programs conducted in secret. Senator
Specter's proposal acknowledges the need for an alternative model
by delegating some responsibility for oversight of the NSA program
to the FISA court, but this proposal has little backing from his
party. 27 An alternative proposal from Senator Schumer also relies
on the judiciary to conduct oversight, but in a very different man-
ner. His plan would greatly increase the number of individuals with
standing to challenge the eavesdropping program and would place
261. Editorial, A Start on NSA Oversight: Quietly, Congress Is Beginning to Do Its Job on War-
rantless Surveillance, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2006, at A16.
262. Id. ("Members of both houses have visited the NSA, and Rep. Heather A. Wilson,
R-N.M., described the agency in an interview as 'forthcoming.'"). Representative Wilson had
previously stated that she had " ' serious concerns' about the surveillance program [because
she believed that the administration was] withholding information about its operations from
many lawmakers." Lichtblau, supra note 102, at Al2.
263. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 168.
264. See supra Part III.B-C.
265. Carol D. Leonnig, Secret Court's Judges Were Warned About NSA Spy Data, WASH. POST,
Feb. 9, 2006, at Bus. Sec.
266. See supra Part IV.A.
267. See supra Part W.A.
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all legal claims relating to the program on a fast track to the Su-
preme Court for review.c'8 The success of Senator Schumer's plan
depends on the administration's assessment of risk in a review by
the Supreme Court.2 ' 9 Given the recent addition of two Bush-
appointees to the Court,270 judicial review may not seem as politi-
cally risky as it once did.
The administration and many majority members of Congress,
however, are not eager to relinquish control over oversight of the
NSA program. They support Senator DeWine's Terrorist Surveil-
lance Act of 2006, which would establish a subcommittee in both
the House and Senate intelligence committees to oversee the sur-
veillance program.17 ' A critical component of this proposal would
explicitly authorize warrantless wiretaps under the auspices of the1 • 272
newly created subcommittees. The proposal therefore ignores
the legal challenges to the surveillance program and creates a
mechanism for the President to continue surveillance without
court approval provided that he has support of the subcommittee.
These competing proposals represent differing views of the need
to hold the Bush administration accountable and the ability of Con-
gress effectively to oversee the NSA surveillance program. On one
side, Senators Specter and Schumer seek to face the legal challenges
head-on, presumably to hold the administration accountable for
any actions taken outside the purview of the law. Judicial oversight
may determine whether the surveillance program is legal under
current law, but these answers may come too late to provide any
real leverage against the administration or to curb the ongoing
surveillance. On the other side, Senator DeWine and his support-
ers seek to rubber-stamp past and future surveillance in a manner
273that may be challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds.
Looking forward, effective oversight of the NSA surveillance pro-
gram will likely require both judicial and congressional action. One
prospective model of oversight would both monitor ongoing surveil-
lance activities and provide a grievance mechanism for individuals
268. Editorial, Resolving the Wiretap Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2006, at A24.
269. Id. ("Even if Congress did pass strong legislation, there is a good chance that
President Bush, who has a sweeping-and unjustified-view of presidential power, would
ignore it. If the Supreme Court told him to stop breaking the law, however, it would be diffi-
cult for him to defy its order.").
270. ChiefJustice John G. Roberts,Jr. andJustice Samuel A. Alito.
271. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 245.
272. Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006, S_ 109th Cong. (2006).
273. The Fourth Amendment requires that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Whether a congressional committee, absent review by a
neutral judge or magistrate, can determine if probable cause exists presents one of several
avenues for challenging Senator DeWine's proposal.
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who believe that they have been illegally targeted. Members of a
DeWine-like committee investigating such grievance claims would
have intelligence clearances authorizing them to review classified
documents relating to the NSA surveillance program. This clear-
ance requirement would assuage concerns of the administration
regarding the sensitivity of the program and the need to keep what
the government knows and how the government knows it a secret.
The administration has thus far rejected ongoing oversight by
the FISA court, but it might be persuaded to support a DeWine-like
congressional committee that engages in oversight of the NSA
program even if that committee also has the power to refer ques-
tions to the FISA court for review or for consultation. For instance,
if both minority and majority members could seek declaratory
opinions from the FISA court on matters within their review, but
the FISA court was not a "required" avenue for approval, perhaps
the administration would deem it a feasible means of oversight of
the surveillance program. Alternatively, the newly-created commit-
tee could develop a proposal for streamlined FISA court review
that would respond to the administration's concerns that the cur-
rent FISA process is laborious and slow.
A similar compromise would create a grievance mechanism for
congressional constituents. A DeWine-like committee would be
authorized to hear initial complaints, for example, from citizens or
interest groups, and then would refer cases of suspected illegal ac-
tivity to the FISA court for more searching review. The subsequent
judicial review could include relaxed standing requirements274 and
be mandated for all cases referred by the committee.
Outside of a change in party leadership or a successful legal
challenge, the administration seems unlikely to accede to any judi-
ciary review of the surveillance program. The best opportunity for
change appears to be the upcoming midterm elections. If the De-
mocrats can successfully take back either house in Congress, they
will have significantly more leverage to pressure the administration
to open the surveillance program to oversight.
274. Standing is usually difficult to prove in surveillance cases because the evidence of
surveillance is highly classified. Brad Knickerbocker, 'Specific' Info on NSA Eavesdropping?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 6, 2006, at 3. Individuals or interest groups who believe that
they have been the target of surveillance are unlikely to have clearance to access classified
NSA documents under the present system. If traditional standing requirements were relaxed
so that congressional constituents had access to the judiciary, it seems likely that the public
would be more supportive of this model of oversight. The proposal might therefore garner
support on both sides of the aisle.
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CONCLUSION
In times such as these when one party controls both the execu-
tive and the legislative branches, the 2006 midterm elections may
present the best opportunity to bring greater congressional over-
sight to secret executive programs. In the interim, Congress should
take bipartisan steps to investigate the NSA domestic surveillance
program and engage the judiciary in a review of the program. The
duty of the executive branch to preserve national security and the
interests of Congress in oversight are not mutually exclusive. The
United States can and must fight terrorism in a manner that simul-
taneously preserves the separation of powers and upholds civil
liberties.

